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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Larry M. Severson appeals from the judgment entered on the district 
court's order summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
"Larry Severson was convicted in 2004 of one count of first-degree 
murder and one count of poisoning food or medicine. Those convictions were 
upheld by the Court on direct appeal." Severson v. State, Docket No. 42830, 
2015 Opinion No. 119, p.1 (Idaho Dec. 23, 2015) ("Opinion"). Following his 
conviction, "Severson petitioned for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel on several grounds." (Opinion, p.2.) The district court 
dismissed Severson's petition and the Idaho Supreme Court recently affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. (Opinion, p.7.) With respect to the reversal, the Court 
"vacate[d] the summary dismissal of Severson's claims for ineffective assistance 
of counsel relating to the alleged improper statements [during closing argument] 
that were not raised on direct appeal." (Opinion, p.7.) The Court determined 
that, although it "could take it upon itself to decide" whether Severson raised a 
genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on that 
claim, "the better course of action is to remand for the district court to consider 
this question." (Opinion, p.7.) Severson's original post-conviction action is still 
pending. 
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While his post-conviction appeal was pending, Severson filed a pro se 
successive petition and a motion seeking leave file a successive 
pp.4-31.) Severson alleged four "causes of action" in his successive petition: (1) 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel for failing to "adequately review 
the trial record or present an independent Confrontation Clause claim" in relation 
to testimony from Dr. Glen Groben regarding the results of tests he did not 
personally perform and testimony from Dr. Gary Dawson, and ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel for failing to "properly" object to Dr. Groben's and Dr. 
Dawson's testimony; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to 
"object to prosecutorial misconduct in voir dire, or seek a curative instruction due 
to multiple instances of misconduct"; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 
failing to "move for a mistrial following an egregious occurrence of prosecutorial 
misconduct" based on the prosecutor's "commentary" in response to an objection 
made "during questioning of Special Agent Bourne," and ineffective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel for "neglect[ing] to include the claim within the amended 
petition"; and (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to "object to the 
improper leading form of questions" asked of Teresa Bucholtz and Tracy Besler, 
and failing to "object to admission of hearsay statements from th[ese] witness[es] 
concerning the state of the Severson's marriage," as well as other hearsay 
statements. (R., pp.9-21 (capitalization altered).) As to his fourth "cause of 
action," Severson also asserted he did not "knowingly or intelligently waive this 
claim nor [could he] recall being properly advised as to his rights involving these 
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[ineffective assistance of trial counsel] claims when conferring with his court 
appointed post-conviction counsel." (R., p.21.) 
Severson also filed a motion requesting the appointment of counsel. (R., 
pp.32-35.) The state filed an answer and a separate motion for summary 
dismissal. (R., pp.41-49.) The district court denied Severson's request for 
counsel and issued a notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.55-63.) Severson filed 
a combined response to the state's motion and the court's notice after which the 
court entered an order denying Severson's successive petition and a judgment 
dismissing the petition. (R., pp.65-77.) Severson filed a motion to reconsider, 
which the court also denied. (R., pp.79-90.) Severson filed a notice of appeal 
timely only from the order denying his motion to reconsider. (R., pp.92-94.) 
Although the district court denied Severson's motion for appointment of 
counsel on appeal (R., p.97), it appears attorneys from the State Appellate 
Public Defender ("SAPD") reviewed the merits of Severson's appeal and then 
requested permission to withdraw after "three attorneys were unable to identify 
any meritorious issues for appeal" (Motion for Leave to Withdraw and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule; Affidavit in Support of Motion for Leave to 
Withdraw and Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule). The Court granted the 
SAPD's motion and Severson is proceeding pro se. 
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ISSUES 
Severson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Severson's successive 
petition for post-conviction relief where the petitioner did not 
knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently waive such claims? 
2. Did the district court err in failing to apply the statutory "sufficient 
reason" exemption, rather than the issue preclusion standard of 
Murphy? 
3. Did the district court err in failing to use the relation back 
doctrine to provide Mr. Severson an opportunity to have his 
claims presented in order to avoid violating due process? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Is this Court without jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the district 
court's order summarily dismissing Severson's successive post-conviction 
petition because Severson's appeal is not timely from that order? 
2. Has Severson failed to carry his burden of showing the district erred by 




This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Consider The Propriety Of The District 
Court's Order Summarily Dismissing Severson's Successive Post-Conviction 
Petition Because Severson's Appeal Is Not Timely From That Order 
A. Introduction 
Severson argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) This Court 
is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Severson's appellate arguments 
because Severson's appeal is not timely from the summary dismissal order. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"'A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when 
brought to [the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to 
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of 
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 
57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free 
review. Kavaiecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. 
C. This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Entertain Severson's Challenges To 
The District Court's Order Summarily Dismissing His Successive Post-
Conviction Petition 
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed 
within 42 days of the filing of the final judgment or order from which the appeal is 
taken. In civil cases, the time for appeal may be tolled by "the filing of a timely 
motion [except, inter alia, motions under I.R.C.P. 60] which, if granted could 
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affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in the action." 
.AR 14(a). The time limits of I.AR 14(a) are jurisdictional. I R 21. Where 
an appellant has failed to timely appeal an order of the district court, this Court 
does "not have jurisdiction to entertain a direct challenge to that order." State v. 
Roberts, 126 Idaho 920, 922, 894 P.2d 153, 155 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The district court entered its order summarily dismissing Severson's 
successive post-conviction petition on July 7, 2014. (R., p.70.) Severson filed 
his notice of appeal 78 days later, on September 23, 2014. (R., p.92.) Because 
Severson did not file his notice of appeal within 42 days of the order summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction, his appeal is not timely from that order. 
Severson did file a motion for reconsideration on July 23, 2014 (R., p.79) 
- 16 days after the court entered its order summarily dismissing the post-
conviction petition; but that motion did not toll the 42-day period in which 
Severson was required to file a notice of appeal from the order of summary 
dismissal. Although Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) provides that "the time for an 
appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is terminated by the filing of 
a timely motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of 
law or any judgment in the action," the rule "except[s] motions under Rule 60 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." Severson cited I.R.C.P. 11 (2)(B) as a basis 
for his motion to reconsider and relied on a Ninth Circuit case, which in turn 
discussed motions to reconsider under F.R.C.P. 59(e). (R., p.80 (citing Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2011)).) However, I.R.C.P. 11 (2)(8) 
governs motions to reconsider interlocutory orders and motions to reconsider 
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order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment." The cou 
summary dismissal order is neither an interlocutory order nor an order after entry 
of judgment. Thus, I. R. C. P. 11 (2)(B) does not apply to Severson's request for 
reconsideration. Severson's reliance on F.R.C.P. 59 is also misplaced because 
it is a federal rule that governs federal proceedings, not state court actions. 
Severson's motion to reconsider also cannot be construed as one under I.R.C.P. 
59 because the basis for Severson's motion does not fall within any of the 
reasons for reconsideration authorized by that rule. See I.R.C.P. 59(a). Even if 
Severson's motion could be considered a Rule 59 motion, the motion was not 
filed within 14 days, as required by I.R.C.P. 59(e), and only a timely motion 
terminates the period for filing an appeal. 1 The only basis for Severson's motion 
to reconsider is I.R.C.P. 60(b), but that rule does not terminate the time for filing 
an appeal. As such, Severson's appeal is only timely from the order denying his 
motion to reconsider. (Compare R., p.89 (Order Denying Reconsideration, filed 
August 25, 2014) with p.92 (Notice of Appeal, filed September 23, 2014).) 
1 Severson acknowledges the 14-day filing requirement in his motion to 
reconsider, and references the "mailbox rule." (R., p.80.) Under the mailbox 
rule, pleadings filed by pro se inmates are deemed filed at the time of delivery to 
prison authorities, rather than when received by the court clerk. Munson v. 
State, 128 Idaho 639, 642, 917 P.2d 796, 799 (1996). Severson signed his 
motion to reconsider on July 21, 2014 (R., p.83), the 14th day after the court 
entered judgment (R., p. 77). Ordinarily, however, a pro se inmate claiming 
application of the mailbox rule must present evidence - generally in the form of 
prison mail logs - demonstrating the timeliness of the filing pursuant to that rule. 
See, ~. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 204-205, 786 P.2d 594, 595-596 (Ct. 
App. 1990); Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 91, 137 P.3d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 
2006). No such evidence is included in the record in this case and, in any event, 
for the reasons already stated, Severson's motion should not be considered a 
Rule 59 motion. 
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Severson did not file of 
of summary dismissal, and because his untimely motion 
reconsideration did not toll the time for filing the notice of appeal, Severson's 
appeal is not timely from the order of summary dismissal. This Court therefore 
does "not have jurisdiction to entertain [Severson's] direct challenge to that 
order." Roberts, 126 Idaho at 922, 894 P.2d at 155 (Ct. App. 1995). 
11. 
Severson Has Failed To Argue, Much Less Demonstrate, That The District Court 
Erred In Denying His Motion For Reconsideration And Has Failed To 
Demonstrate Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Successive Post-
Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Because Severson's appeal is timely only from the district court's order 
denying his motion for reconsideration, that is the only order this Court has 
jurisdiction to review. See Section I.C., supra. Severson, however, does not 
directly challenge the court's order denying his motion for reconsideration. 
Instead, Severson's arguments focus on the alleged error in the district court's 
summary dismissal order. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) Because Severson has 
not even argued, much less demonstrated, that the district court erred in denying 
his motion for reconsideration, the order of the district court must be affirmed. 
State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983) (appellate court 
will not review actions of the district court for which no error has been assigned 
and will not otherwise search the record for unspecified errors). 
Alternatively, the order of the district court should be affirmed on its 
merits. The district court summarily dismissed Severson's successive post-
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because failed to show a reason overcome 
against successive petitions. , pp.74-75.) The also found 
that Severson's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were untimely. 
(R., p.75.) Severson contends "the district court erred in denying his filing of the 
verified successive petition for post-conviction relief because [he] did not 
knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently waive such claims." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
Severson also argues the district court "failed to assess the sufficient and 
compelling reasons ... permitting him to raise issues in a successive petition." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Finally, Severson asserts the district court erred by 
failing to apply the "relation back doctrine." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) All of 
Severson's arguments lack merit. Application of the correct legal standards to 
the facts of this case shows the district court did not err in summarily dismissing 
Severson's successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908 or in determining that 
Severson's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were untimely. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
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Severson Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The District Court's Order 
Denying Reconsideration 
Severson's claims on appeal relate the district summary 
dismissal order rather than any complaints particular to the court's order denying 
reconsideration. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) Indeed, Severson's 
request for reconsideration was based on the same arguments he made in his 
combined response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss and the state's 
motion for summary dismissal (compare R., pp.65-68 with R., pp.79-83), and the 
district court's order denying Severson's motion to reconsider reflects as much in 
that the court notes nothing in Severson's memorandum "cause[d] the court to 
reach a different conclusion" (R., p.90). Because Severson's claims on appeal 
directly challenge the district court's summary dismissal order and not any 
unique error in the district court's order denying reconsideration, and because 
the order denying reconsideration is the only action properly reviewed on appeal, 
this Court should affirm. Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 159, 657 P.2d at 23. 
D. Alternatively, Severson Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary 
Dismissal Of His Successive Petition 
To the extent this Court considers Severson's complaints about the district 
court's summary dismissal order, Severson's claims fail. Idaho Code § 19-4908 
states: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act 
must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended 
application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that 
resu!ted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding 
the applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a 
subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief 
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asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was 
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application. 
The district court correctly dismissed Severson's successive petition 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908 because Severson failed to articulate a sufficient 
reason that would allow him to proceed. The "sufficient reason" Severson 
offered in district court was his allegation that· post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective. (R., pp.66-67.) As noted by the district court (R., p.74), this is no 
longer a viable sufficient reason in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in 
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), in which the Court held 
that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason for 
purposes of I.C. § 19-4908. Moreover, contrary to Severson's assertion on 
appeal (Appellant's Brief, p. 7), post-conviction counsel was not deficient for 
failing to search the trial record for additional claims for Severson to add to his 
petition because post-conviction counsel has no obligation to do so. See 
Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369 (quotations and citation omitted) 
("Although the petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to 
search the record for possible nonfrivolous claims, counsel should be appointed 
if the facts alleged raise the possibility of a valid claim."). Severson has failed to 
articulate any legal basis for reversing the district court's determination that the 
alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient 
reason allowing the pursuit of a successive petition. 
Severson also appears to challenge the district court's determination that 
his ineffective of trial counsel claims are untimely. In particular, Severson 
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contends he did not know these claims were "omitted" from amended petition 
until "his appellate counsel in those proceedings" brought it to his attention, and 
asserts the "relation back doctrine" should apply. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6, 8-9.) 
Based on his complaints about post-conviction counsel, Severson's use of the 
word "omitted" presumably relates to post-conviction counsel's failure to add the 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to Severson's initial petition. 
However, for purposes of determining whether the claims were timely, the 
relevant inquiry is when the claims were known. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
"repeatedly held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims can or should be 
known after trial." Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247,253,220 P.3d 1066, 1072 
(2009). Accordingly, such claims should have been raised in a post-conviction 
petition "within one (1) year form the expiration of the time for appeal or from the 
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-
4902(a). The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Severson's convictions on May 29, 
2009, and denied rehearing on August 24, 2009. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 
694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009). The ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims 
Severson alleged in his successive petition, filed May 9, 2014 (R., p.4), were well 
beyond the statutory limitation period and the district court properly concluded 
the claims are untimely. 
Severson's reliance on the relation back doctrine, apparently for the 
purpose of having his claims considered timely, is misplaced. The Court of 
Appeals applied the relation back doctrine in the context of a post-conviction 




applied the doctrine to allow the petitioner 
litigate claims that were inadequately raised in 
file a 
in 
petition because post-conviction counsel was ineffective. kl In doing so, the 
Court relied on Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981), which 
the Supreme Court expressly overruled in Murphy, supra. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 
at 798, 992 P.2d at 793. Thus, Severson's assertion that he can take advantage 
of the relation back doctrine because he believes post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective fails. 
Because Severson has failed to show error in the dismissal of his 
successive post-conviction petition, he is not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Severson's successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 2015. 
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